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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the regional unemployment rate in Newport News, Virginia,
was 4.2%, a strong sign of economic stability. Nevertheless, the region
reported a second stunning figure during the same period: a 69% in-
crease in requests for food assistance during one twelve-month period.!
In Macon, Georgia, the reported increase hovered at a little under 40%;
in Greeley, Colorado, 50%.2 Publicly distributed food from the govern-
ment fell from 22.2% to 13.4% between 1991 and 1997, leaving the pri-
vate sector and hungry families to fill a shortfall of 24.5 billion pounds of
food in the next six years. The burgeoning food insecurity of the working
poor can be linked directly to recent changes in social welfare policies.4
The conservative parsimony in funding social welfare in the 1990s has fed
the growing hunger for charitable services;5 the trend, however, is not
new.6 Beginning in the early 1980s, the federal government began to re-
treat from directly funding anti-poverty programs. Instead, government
policies called for an aggressive combination of state, local, and charita-
ble deliveries. New policies minimized federal involvement in social
t J.D., Yale Law School, 1999; M.P. Aff., University of Texas at Austin, 1998; B.A., Spel-
man College, 1995. With deepest gratitude to Professors John Simon and Anne Alstott, William
J. Dobson, and Robert and Carolyn Abrams.
1. Elaine Rivera, Hungry at the Feast: In Spite of Prosperity and Job Growth, a New Study
Warns of a Festering Crisis Among the Working Poor, TIME, July 21, 1997, at 38.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.; see also infra Part II.
5. For the purposes of this Note, charities are only those organizations primarily dedicated
to providing subsistence, housing, and related services to the poor.
6. See generally THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY AND THE GOVERNING OF AMERICA (Lester M.
Salamon & Michael S. Lund eds., 1984) (discussing the effect of Reagan's budget policies on
social services and nonprofit organizations); Constance Casey, Who Will Help the Helpers?
Charity May Begin at Home but Not in the House Under Newt Gingrich, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan.
22, 1995, at A4 (referring to a Gingrich statement calling on nonprofits to aid those hurt by wel-
fare reform and the lack of federal funding for charitable organizations); Milt Freudheim,
Charities Aiding Poor Fear Loss of Government Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1996, at B8
(discussing various state and local charities that have lost grants and subsidies).
7. See ALAN J. ABRAMSON & LESTER M. SALAMON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND THE
NEW FEDERAL BUDGET 23-53 (1986).
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services and devolved poverty assistance to state and local governments!
Devolution, traditionally a shift of services and resources to state and lo-
cal governments, has an added dimension. Rather than a shift from gov-
eminent to government, the movement includes a transfer of responsi-
bility from the federal government to private charities. This transfer of
responsibility must be scrutinized. With devolution at its height, the
greatest fear for charities is the impact of the crowning achievement of
post-Reaganomics, the Personal Responsibilities Act of 1996 ("Welfare
Reform Act") The Welfare Reform Act0 slashes $504 billion from the
national welfare budget through 2002." When individuals lose govern-
ment benefits, charities are the only institutional recourse for dislocated
families and individuals. 2 Unlike social welfare programs of the past, the
safety net no longer exists. 3
For example, twenty-one million Americans requested emergency
food help in 1997.14 Thirty-one percent of the hungry reported a recent
loss or reduction of Food Stamps, a federal food subsidy program.15 For
the homeless, the numbers show that an average of 20% of overall re-
quests for shelter and 24% of requests by homeless families were denied
8. See id. Although state and local governments will play a fundamental role in the new re-
gime of funding poverty services, this Note will focus solely on the role of the federal govern-
ment. The data on state responses are incomplete, but some states have begun to feel the im-
pact of decreased funding. For example, Ohio chipped in $1.5 million for food pantries in 1997,
a first for the state. See Alice Thomas, Pantries No Longer a Stop Gap, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Dec. 7, 1997, at B1.
9. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 601-609 (West Supp. 1999).
10. Although this Note refers to the Welfare Reform Act specifically, charities receive
funding from several government sources. This Note focuses, however, on results of the Welfare
Reform Act.
11. See Increased Private Support for Public Assistance Programs: Hearings Regarding the
Mutual Roles of Government and Churches in Providing Basic Human Services for Poor and
Vulnerable Groups Before the Subcomm. on Children and Families of the Senate Labor Comm.,
104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Rev. Fred Kammer, President of Catholic Charities)
[hereinafter Kammer Testimony]. This figure includes Food Stamps, AFDC, EITC, Medicaid
and across-the-board cuts in nondefense discretionary programs; it does not include cuts in
housing programs or in Medicare.
12. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 §§ 601-
609.
13. Under the Temporary Aid to Needy Families program, the living subsistence grant in
the Welfare Reform Act, one member of each family on welfare is required to find employment
within two years or lose benefits and lifetime benefits are limited to five years. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 608.
14. See Second Harvest, Hunger 1997: The Faces and Facts, Executive Summary (visited
June 21, 1999) <http:llwww.secondharvest.org/researchlfaces/section2.htm>.
15. For a more thorough discussion of the anti-poverty programs of the 20th century, see
JUDITH M. GUERON, REFORMING WELFARE WITH WORK (1987); H.P. MILLER, POVERTY
AMERICAN STYLE (1966); J.T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY, 1900-
1980 (1981); R.D. PLOTNICK & F. SKIDMORE, PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY: A REVIEW OF
THE 1964-1975 DECADE (1975).
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due to lack of resources. 6 To place those numbers in context, one must
realize that an estimated 750,000 people are homeless on any given
night.' For the agencies trying to service this population, it is impossible
to miss the direct correlation between the increased demand for poverty
relief services and the decline in federal welfare programs. When Con-
gress cut $23 billion from the Food Stamp program over five years, it al-
located only $100 million for food banks to take up the burden.' Chari-
ties also face an expanding need to provide emergency shelter and low-
income housing.' 9 Medical care to the poor, in light of the funding recis-
sions in Medicaid, is a third area of grave concern.
The WeFeed Food Bank is just one of the organizations charged with
meeting these newest increases in the poor community.2' Last year, its
operating costs were $89,000; its income from donations and grants to-
taled $62,000, leaving a deficit of $17,000. In addition, WeFeed turned
away a number of families, recognizing that to provide services to them
would cost an addition $28,000. Organizations like WeFeed are tacitly
and sometimes explicitly told to absorb these costs and serve the newest
members of the poor community. Even more, they are exhorted to do so
with decreases in funding--essentially, to find alternate sources of in-
come.
These dueling commands effectively give birth to a peculiar relative
of cognitive dissonance, one that this Note terms operational dissonance.2
Cognitive dissonance is the "condition of conflict or anxiety resulting
16. See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND
HOiLESSNESS IN AMERiCA'S Crims: 1998 (1998).
17. National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, Homelessness and Poverty in
America (visited Mar. 28,1999) <http://www.nlchp.org/htpusa.htm>.
18. See David Sarasohn, A Problem Eating at America, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, Mar. 24,
1998, at A3.
19. The Department of Housing and Urban Development's budget lost $11 billion between
1980 and 1995 and an additional $5.2 billion in 1996. Between 1978 and 1991, housing needs for
the poor increased by 1.1 million. See Kammer Testimony, supra note 11.
20. Medicaid, the federal medical assistance program for the indigent, faces sharp cuts. Be-
cause medical care for the poor is now the province of the states, estimated cuts in the number
of qualified aid recipients range from twenty to thirty-five percent. Nonprofit hospitals, despite
their tax status, tend to shun offering care to the poor, relegating care to charity clinics or mo-
bile hospital units. See id.
21. WeFeed is a hypothetical food bank program designed to offer a cogent example of the
crisis faced by charities. I will use WeFeed to demonstrate various economic principles of my
argument.
22. As I define operational dissonance, the tension exists between the federal government's
expectations of charities and its actions in promulgating tax policy. Cf Evelyn Brody, Institu-
tional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REv. 433, 467 (1996) (describing a form
of institutional dissonance wherein a nonprofit "must accommodate the institutional expecta-
tions of its industry, its donors, its volunteers, its members, its beneficiaries, its clientele, its cor-
porate sponsors, its government granting agencies and the taxpaying public. Inevitably, expecta-
tions conflict.").
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from inconsistency between one's beliefs and one's actions." Opera-
tional dissonance describes the crisis arising from a tension between the
federal government's expectations of charities and federal funding poli-
cies. We expect nonprofits to provide costly services to a rapidly ex-
panding population and to pay for those services. Concomitantly, we es-
tablish policies that cut funding and preclude the generation of the tax-
exempt income that would allow these organizations to meet our service
expectations.24
To resolve operational dissonance, we must adjust either our expecta-
tions of charities or our actions towards them. One way of adjusting our
actions would be through an exemption from the unrelated business in-
come tax ("UBIT"). Although additional steps are needed to maximize
charities' utility to society, such as an expansion of the tax incentives for
lending to charities," the passage of the charity tax credit,2 6 and an in-
crease in direct government subsidization,27 this Note will focus solely on
the effects of operational dissonance in our social services and the role of
the UBIT exemption in resolving this dissonance.
Part II of this Note establishes the motive for targeting charities for
exemption, rather than a broad-based exemption for all nonprofits. Sec-
tion A explains operational dissonance in greater depth, detailing the
mismatch of expectations and resources with regard to charities. Section
B examines the distinct funding problems endemic to charitable organi-
zations, and describes the inadequacy of the current tax breaks for chari-
ties: charitable deductions and the income exemption. Section C re-
sponds to these phenomena by redefinining charity and proposing a
qualification test.
Part III is devoted to a presentation of the U-BIT exemption as a re-
sponse to operational dissonance. Through the prism of the WeFeed hy-
pothetical, this Part explores an alternative funding scheme for poverty-
servicing charities. Section A outlines the UBIT exemption proposal as it
relates to the current crisis. Section B describes the history of UBIT. Sec-
tion C lays out the current context for the U-BIT exemption and how it
could strengthen poverty-servicing charities.
Part IV responds to probable critiques of UBIT exemptions. Section
A anticipates potential objections from policymakers. Section B ad-
dresses the underlying principle for the UBIT, the unfair competition ar-
23. AMERICAN HERrrAGE DIcIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 368 (3d ed. 1992).
24. See infra Section III.B.
25. See generally Seth M. Hendon, Note, The Possibility of Tax Incentives for Lending to
Charitable Organizations, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 414 (1990).
26. See infra Section III.C.
27. See generally ABRAMSON & SALAMON, supra note 7, at 83-86.
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gument. Section C engages the economic efficiency arguments posed by
critics of UBIT exemptions. Section D focuses on the most recent cri-
tique, which alleges that UBIT exemptions result in limited accountabil-
ity of nonprofits.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that the UBIT exemption for charita-
ble nonprofits is the proper vehicle for beginning to resolve operational
dissonance in our construction of social welfare services,.
II. CHARITIES AND THE RESOURCE CRUNCH
This Part explains operational dissonance, which derives from the
contrary policy directives government gives private charities. To frame
the presentation, Section A describes the first policy directives-ones
that embody the expectations government has of charities. As the federal
government rethinks its responsibility to provide social welfare services
to the poor, it concurrently calls upon private charities to fill the resulting
void. Section B addresses the second conflicting directive. It reveals how
the tax code's assumptions about "income exemption" prevent charities
from engaging in activities that would allow them to finance their role of
providing social welfare services. Section C recommends a change in the
definition of public charities in the tax code and, relatedly, in public con-
sciousness, to draw greater attention to the need to create special initia-
tives to address operational dissonance.
A. Federal Policies and Operational Dissonance
This Section explains operational dissonance in the context of the
evolving charity-government relationship. The first branch of operational
dissonance is the result of government's devolution-era expectations of
charities. The basis of these expectations lies in the advent of charities,
which was the result of government and market failures.2 With charities
as a tool for service delivery, the federal government systematized its ex-
pectations in several policies promulgated over the last two decades.
1. A Response to Government and Market Failure
The engagement of charitable services in social welfare policy finds its
roots in companion theories-government failure and market failure.
Nonprofit status exists for the promotion of organizations that can serve
to "lesse[n] the burdens of Government." 29
28. The American economy is divided into three sectors, public, private and nonprofit. I
discuss the separate expectations of each in Subsection II.A.1.
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3) (1998).
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We historically look to the private sector to provide opportunities for
employment, income generation, and competitive services, and we de-
pend on the market to regulate revenue and to promote efficiency.
From the government and its attendant agencies, we expect social wel-
fare services and management of the marketplace. 1 In the nonprofit sec-
tor, we see a bridge between the failure of the private sector to substan-
tively employ or to employ at all and the government's failure to satisfy
subsistence and housing needs that fall in the gap. Because of extensive
government and market failures, certain nonprofits have had to fill in the
gap by providing services. As redefined, the charity category is now con-
sciously limited to recognize the peculiar role charities play in assisting
government and the market with relief for the poor.
2. The Codification of Federal Expectations of Charities
Over time, the federal government radically changed its philosophy
regarding its role in providing services to the poor. Where once the gov-
ernment's role was to provide extensive and exhaustive social welfare
services, government devolution policies mandate that the federal gov-
ernment step back from its traditional role as primary provider for the
poor and pass the mantle of responsibility to private charities.5
The government's shift in its social welfare policy approach has led to
immediate material and public-relations crises for charities. 6 Charities in
30. See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 504
(1990).
31. See id.
32. Substantial employment refers to jobs that provide a living wage, that is, the ability to
meet the needs of subsistence.
For a more thorough discussion of the need for full employment, see WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1987). Wilson explores the impact of wage and price stability, economic dislocation,
and the need for full employment. His chapter with Robert Aponte and Kathryn Neckerman
describes the impact of the minimum wage on the ability to answer subsistence needs and the
eventual reliance on governmental aid. Although the chapter focuses on a rebuttal of Charles
Murray's Losing Ground, the implications for social welfare are evident, particularly vis-A-vis
the need for a better wage system. Wilson posits that a minimum wage, or a lack of a living
wage, encourages dependence on social welfare services. See WILSON, Joblessness Versus Wel-
fare Effects: A Further Reexamination, in WILSON, supra, at 93.
33. See Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law and Pub-
lic Policy Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE L.J. 731, 744 (1994) (reviewing
CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? (1992)).
34. Some will argue that the government's decision to divest itself of responsibility to the
poor is simply an expected pendulum shift in social policy. Compare, for instance, the Elizabe-
than Poor Laws, which left the responsibility of caring for the poor to private charities.
35. See Hendon, supra note 25, at 415. Devolution also required that state and local gov-
ernments take on a greater role in providing social services.
36. See CHARLES WOLPERT, CHARITY FINANCING 11-15 (1989) (discussing the current dif-
ficulties facing charities); see also Lester M. Salamon, Rethinking Public Management: Third
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both eras were seen as vehicles for providing services to the poor 7 The
meaning of "helping the poor" had significantly changed, however, under
different government regimes. Under the Great Society regime, private
charities assisted government, focusing on contracted service delivery.3
In the current era of devolution, the safety net has disappeared, and the
trickle of poor clients requesting help from private charities has increased
to a flood.39 Charities are left with their old directive to assist the needy.
They find, however, that it is not enough for them to provide the supple-
mental food bank or an emergency shelter. Instead they are being asked
to provide basic food and medical assistance and to build low-income
housing.4 The material effects of the government's change in roles have
become increasingly clear. Charities know that, when people lose gov-
ernment benefits,41 charities themselves are now the only recourse.
42
B. Lack of Resources as the Second Branch of Operational Dissonance
Although government has been quick to call on charities to address
the needs of poor persons, it has failed to fund charities adequately and
to realize that federal tax policy treats charities in ways that prohibits
them from taking on their enhanced role altogether. This Section dis-
cusses the lack of resources available to charities, thus laying the
groundwork for the UBIT exemption proposal.
1. Lack of Resources
Government studies show the high cost of providing social welfare
services to the poor.43 This news comes as no shock to private charities.
Although charities are supposed to provide expensive services to an ever-
increasing number of people, falling contributions and dwindling gov-
ernment support constrain their ability to do so effectively.44 Charities,
Party Government and the Changing Forms of Government Action, 29 Pub. Pol'y 255, 255-273
(1981) (critiquing devolution in its early stages).
37. See ABRAMSON & SALAMON, supra note 7, at 53 ("Underlying many of the cuts in fed-
eral domestic spending in recent years is a body of conservative social theory that views gov-
eminent and voluntary organizations as natural antagonists and that supports government
budget cuts as a way to strengthen the voluntary sector by getting government out of its way.").
38. See RuTH HOOGLAND DEHOOG, CONTRACTING OUT FOR HUMAN SERVICES:
ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 1-33 (1984) (discussing the his-
tory of contracting out services).
39. See SUSAN R. BERNSTEIN, MANAGING CONTRACTED SERVICES IN THE NONPROFIT
AGENCY 177-200 (1991).
40. See Second Harvest, supra note 14.
41. For an example of legislation under which this will take place, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 608
(West Supp. 1999).
42. See supra Part I.
43. See Kammer Testimony, supra note 11.
44. See id.
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like any other organization, "ultimately must cover the full economic
costs of all resources they consume. There is no magic by which a non-
profit can produce a service at a lower cost than can a for-profit firm.""
The federal retreat on funding to social programs parallels a similar re-
treat from subsidizing nonprofits, including charities.46 The onus has
fallen on individual donors to ante up. It is unlikely, however, that phi-
lanthropy alone can replenish the depleted coffers. Charities face two
problems. The first is a general decline in charitable giving by individual
donors to qualified charities.47 The second is a decrease in government
subsidies to nonprofits.4'
The devolution of poverty services to charities places a heavy burden
on them that many will be unable to meet. Charities are largely depend-
ent on government funding with minimal assistance from private dona-
tions.49 Only about ten percent of contributions to human services organi-
zations have originated with private donations. ° Less than half of those
monies are spent on services to low-income families." When coupled with
dollars spent by religious organizations, some estimate that during the
1990s only around $12 billion in private charitable donations assisted low-
income families. At this stage charitable giving cannot offset the esti-
mated impact of federal cuts in social welfare programs. 2 Some projec-
tions suggest that only an increase of 50% or more in giving to human
services organizations could offset government cuts. Indeed, present rates
of private contributions could only compensate for as much as five per-
cent of governmental reductions, although more conservative estimates
place the figure at one to two percent." To meet the needs of the poor
through charity, contributions would have to increase by more than four
times the current projected growth rate. 4
Given the overwhelming evidence that charities rely on government
funds almost exclusively, funds for poverty-servicing charities, therefore,
45. Atkinson, supra note 30, at 504.
46. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
47. See WOLPERT, supra note 36, at 41.
48. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
49. See WOLPERT, supra note 36, at 27.
50. See AMERICAN ASS'N OF FUNDRAISING COUNSEL TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING
USA 1995, at 30 (1996) [hereinafter GIVING USA]; see also Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, So-
cial Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped Potential of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325,327 (1997).
51. See REBECCA BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION 202 (1997).
52. See id. See generally WOLPERT, supra note 36.
53. See BLANK, supra note 51, at 202.
54. See Kammer Testimony, supra note 11.
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must come from government sources& In contrast to private donations,
government spending during the same time equaled roughly $200 bil-
lion.56 This figure represents almost thirty percent of the total budget of
all nonprofits For instance, in 1993, Catholic Charities received more
than seventy-five percent of its total income from government funding,
almost $1.2 billion.8 The cutbacks in federal spending "will result in sig-
nificant reductions in federal funds flowing to nonprofit organizations.""
Between 1996 and 2002, nonprofits will lose an estimated $253.6 billion in
federal revenuesi 0 The gap in funding has only grown wider in recent
years and is expected to increase. Unless the decreases in funding and
charitable donations are countered with other forms of funding, charities
will be unable to meet the needs of the poor.
2. The Dissonance in Tax Policy
As demonstrated, the current subsidy regime unfairly burdens chari-
ties that provide social services by cutting back federal funds and relying
too heavily on waning donations. Certainly the standard provisions that
apply to nonprofits-for example, the charitable deduction and the in-
come exemption-act as subsidies. However, these exemptions are less
effective for organizations that serve the poor. Charities, like other or-
ganizations, are encouraged to generate income through donations, gov-
ernment grants, and the implicit tax subsidy of the "income exemption.""
The exemption of nonprofit income was designed to allow nonprofits to
raise funds through solicitation and, if necessary, the sale of goods and
services. Historically, however, charities have hesitated to seek revenue
through commercial ventures because they, unlike other nonprofits, can
rarely justify their commercial activities as "substantially related," 62 a
fundamental requirement of the unrelated business income tax. 6 Gov-
55. See Lester M. Salamon, The Charitable Behavior of the Charitable Sector: The Case of
Social Services, in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? (Charles T. Clotfelter ed.,
1992); WOLPERT, supra note 36, at 27.





61. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 836-37
(1980).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1) (1998). "Substantially related" requires that a nonprofit
demonstrate a substantial relationship between the service sold and the tax-exempt purpose of
the organization. For further discussion, see Part III.
63. When a museum opens a gift shop or a university sells research, although they are sub-
ject to UBIT review, a host of exceptions often preclude the imposition of income tax on the
resulting revenue. Charities, however, suffer from a lack of related services. For example, a
food bank is unlikely to open a gift shop, and, were it to open a restaurant, it would be subject
Yale Law & Policy Review
ernment has thus reengineered policies to prod charities to serve a major
and costly social role, but it persists in treating charities under the federal
tax laws as though they are supplementary providers of social services.
C. The Need for a New Category of Tax-Exempt Organizations: The
Charities
The hypothetical WeFeed shelter, like other shelters, food pantries,
and free medical clinics, operates to serve the poorest among us. They
offer services to those who have been ignored by the economic boom,
those who have limited resources and limited options. WeFeed depends
on the rest of society to assist it in its endeavors. In order to allow chari-
table organizations to address the needs of the poor, we must first revise
our popular and legislative perceptions of charitable organizations. Tra-
ditionally, tax laws have grouped all nonprofits together. The tax code
has defined a charitable organization as any organization that provides
services without regard to profit." According to Treasury regulations, a
charitable organization created under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code can provide a range of several services, including service to the
poor, the advancement of religion, education or science, and the promo-
tion of social welfare." Notably, only a subset of these organizations,
those that serve the poor, have stepped into the void left by the federal
government and provided the needy with emergency food and shelter,
low-income housing, medical care, and other staples of subsistence.
Our current grouping of nonprofits substantially burdens poverty-
servicing charities.66 The regulations mask their need for special treat-
ment and hide their unique problems. For example, charities are the only
group of nonprofits whose fiscal health has been damaged by welfare re-
form laws.67 They bear the high cost of supporting the poor, and they face
additional operating costs as they expand their administrative structures
to coordinate social services. Additionally, these charities are worthy of
special respect; they have agreed to fulfill the covenant to help the poor
to the UBIT and revocation of its nonprofit status. I explore this distinction in greater detail in
Section III.A.
64. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3) (1998).
65. "[C]haritable is used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense and is,
therefore, not to be construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of
other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of 'charity' as developed by
judicial decisions. Such terms include: Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivi-
leged. .. " Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(2).
66. I will use the term "nonprofit" throughout the Note to refer to all tax-exempt entities
governed by § 501(c)(3). "Poverty-servicing charity" and "charity" refer only to the organiza-
tions delivering relief and services to the poor and satisfying the definition I propose here.
67. See ABRAMSON & SALAMON, supra note 7, at 86-90; see also Hendon, supra note 25, at
415-17.
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now that it has been broken by the public sector. Given their generosity,
they have earned the right to demand concessions from both the private
and public sector.
These concessions must be codified to have real impact on charities
and their ability to generate revenue. The modified definition would go
beyond the antiseptic description included in the current regulations. In
addition to the standard qualifications, the new definition would include
specific requirements for operation and organization.6 Qualified charities
would satisfy one of two criteria. Either they would be organized and op-
erated primarily to assist the poor with not less than seventy-five percent
of annual expenses directed to that effort, or they would be organized to
solicit and collect gifts and grants to be distributed to charities that satisfy
the first criterion.6
Setting the threshold for annual expenses at seventy-five percent dis-
qualifies organizations that would organize simply to capitalize on the
proffered exemptions and subsidies.0 The threshold also encourages or-
ganizations, such as faith-based entities, to increase their proportion of
poor-relief efforts without fundamentally altering the nature of the or-
ganization. Restricting the definition of charity allows for targeted pro-
posals designed to address the impact of devolution and its service-
slashing policies.
68. When organizing a nonprofit under § 501(c)(3), the Treasury Regulations require that two
independent tests be met: organizational and operational. The primary purpose of the tests is to
insure that organizations utilizing the § 501(c)(3) status adhere to the exempt purposes set forth.
Specifically, § 501(c)(3)-seeking entities must prove that they are organized and operated exclu-
sively for the charitable purposes recognized. Failure to meet either test automatically disqualifies
an organization from tax exemption. The organizational test is designed to ensure that the stated
purpose of the nonprofit, particularly its articles of incorporation, meets the requirements set by
§ 501(c)(3). The operational test addresses the actual activities sponsored by or participated in by
the nonprofit
69. The proposed definition reflects the character ascribed to charities by the Revenue Acts
of 1918 and 1921, with substantial modifications.
[T]he Service stated that the term "charitable" in § 231(6) of the Revenue Acts of 1918
and 1921 (predecessor provisions of Section 501(c)(3)) was limited to the relief of the
poor: "[C]haritable" in its popular and ordinary sense pertains to the relief of the poor.
In Section 231(6) of the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 the organizations enumerated
are religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational.... It seems obvious that the
intent must have been to use the word "charitable" in Section 231(6) in its more re-
stricted and common meaning and not to include either religious, scientific, literary,
educational, civil or other social welfare organizations. Otherwise, the word
"charitable" would have been used by itself as an all-inclusive term, for in its broadest
sense, it includes all of the specific purposes enumerated. That the word "charitable"
was used in a restricted sense is also shown from its position in the Section. The lan-
guage is "religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational."
FRANCES R. HILL & BARBARA L. KIRSCHTEN, FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS §§ 2,5 (1994) (quoting I.T. 1800, I-2 C.B. 152 (1923)).
70. The threshold nevertheless allows charities to invest in administrative costs, additional
staff not covered directly, and adjunct programs such as education, job training, or child care.
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III. WEFEED AND A NEW SOURCE OF INCOME
The resolution of WeFeed's resource woes requires society to solve
the conflict between its beliefs and actions by either altering the devolu-
tion of poverty services to charities or increasing their access to capital.
Looking back at two decades of devolution and the congressional testi-
mony raising these issues, it is unlikely that government will so radically
shift its expectations. Solving operational dissonance through adjustment
of our tax-expenditure policies71 for charities is simpler.7 The existing tax-
expenditure policies of charitable donations and government subsidies do
not meet the expanding need for charities' unique services.
Where then can charities like WeFeed turn for funds? The obvious
answer is that WeFeed, like museums and colleges and other nonprofits,
should find a profitable venture and generate revenue to support its pov-
erty services. Indeed, the charitable exemption exists, in part, to facilitate
just this solution. Nonprofits are not precluded from generating a profit,
only from distributing the profit to individuals who have a stake in the
organization.73 Thus, the exemption of income subsidy does hold promise
if there is actual income to exempt-which there is not for most poverty-
servicing charities.
Unfortunately for organizations like WeFeed, commercial enterprise
is a risky venture. Because of their limited size and cash-strapped status,
charity-run businesses would be responsible for producing at least a third
of a charity's revenue to justify their existence. Yet, the regulatory con-
struction of the unrelated business income tax and accompanying case
law indicate that the types of businesses envisioned would endanger the
charity.
A fundamental policy concern with the UBIT is the capital lost to the
charity's mission because of the heavy taxation of business-generated in-
come. Taxed at corporate rates on any money produced by the opera-
tion, the significant social cost of thousands of dollars absorbed despite
the destination of the income must be considered. The first principles
that buttress tax-exemption for charities do not disappear simply because
of the more commercial source of funds. WeFeed and its companion
charities need funds-and in unprecedented amounts. UBIT serves only
to siphon those funds away from the nonprofits that need them most.
71. Tax expenditure policies are the primary source of funding for charities after direct sub-
sidization. See infra Section III.C.
72. The government's unwillingness to increase direct spending is apparent in the cuts
through welfare reform, the primary source of funding for charities. In short, we cannot force
greater amounts of private giving and are unwilling to increase government spending.
73. The preclusion against private inurement does not, however, include just compensation
to employees of a nonprofit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3) (1990).
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The solution lies then in exemption from the UBIT. Such an exemp-
tion would free charities to enter the commercial market with other non-
profits, fully utilizing their exemption-of-income subsidy and wholly re-
dedicating profits to the furtherance of their exempt purpose.
This Part presents the proposed UBIT exemption, its rationale, and
expected impact. Section A presents the UBIT exemption proposal and
defines the parameters of the alternate "poverty services" test. Section B
illustrates why UBIT poses such a danger to charities. Section C distin-
guishes between current exceptions and the effects of the proposed ex-
emption. Section C also reintroduces the WeFeed example to demon-
strate the effects of the UBIT exemption, asserting that the impact of the
UBIT exemption would provide three important benefits to charities.
Section D concludes with the feasibility of the UBIT exemption and an
explanation of its benefits. The exemption would encourage the charities
to seek out new sources of income, endowing charities with the same
autonomy enjoyed by other members of the independent sector. The
UBIT exemption would also allow charitable organizations to retain
critical income.
A. The UBIT Exemption Proposal
The solution to the crisis prompted by operational dissonance lies in
exempting charities from the UBIT by waiving the "substantially related"
test.74 Charities would thus be free to engage in unrelated commercial ac-
tivities and, for the first time, surrender none of their profits to the
Treasury. Charities would enjoy this second benefit only when they allo-
cate substantial portions of the money to fund their exempt purposes.
1. The Importance of Unrelated Business Income
UBIT, while ostensibly only a tax on unrelated business income, func-
tions as a barrier to charities' entry into commercial markets. When most
nonprofits seek to increase their revenue base, they rely on several
sources of funds, including public support, government grants, the sale of
program-related services, and unrelated business income. The last of
these sources, unrelated business income, offers a controllable and sub-
stantial source of income-a source not tied to public whims about giv-
75 76ing,S the vagaries of tax cuts and government grants, or the ability to
74. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(c)(1) (1990).
75. See Bullock, supra note 50, at 327.
76. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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produce program-related services.7 Indeed, recent literature exhorts
nonprofits to enter the for-profit arena through such enterprises as joint
ventures, for-profit subsidiaries, and spin-offs.78
Nevertheless, unrelated business income comes with its own set of pit-
falls, hidden within the UBIT policies. Besides the looming risk of losing
tax-exempt status, charities would also lose a hefty portion of their busi-
ness income to the UBIT 7 9 The potential costs of these pitfalls should not
be underestimated. The value of tax-exempt status lies in the ability to
seek charitable donations and foundation and government grants. Chari-
ties, with few independent resources,80 need the additional income to
fund expanding programs and to lessen their dependence on government
funds."' Other nonprofits avoid the UBIT, taking advantage of numerous
exceptions and carving out new areas of "substantially related" activities.
Indeed, for many nonprofits, "[w]e have just about reached the day when
any tax attorney who has a tax-exempt client paying unrelated business
income tax is probably guilty of malpractice." 2
Unfortunately, the character and mission of charities sharply limit
their ability to circumvent the "substantially related test." As explained
more fully in later sections, poverty-servicing charities have a narrowly
defined mission and are characteristically small or medium-sized organi-
zations. Other nonprofits, on the other hand, primarily fall into two cate-
gories for the "substantially related" test: proprietary charities like hospi-
tals or large endowment organizations such as art museums, or a
hybridization of both-the private or public university. Unlike these typi-
cally larger entities, which can diversify their goals to reach a broader
target population, charities are necessarily limited in scope to serve a
poor population with food, shelter, or subsistence needs. These distinc-
tions can sustain a comfortable delineation of organization type and the
application of the "poverty services" test to regulate exempted organiza-
tions.
77. See James R. Hasselback & Angela Y. Robbins, UBIT Exceptions Let Non-Profits Run
Tax-Free Businesses, 25 TAX'N FOR L. 36,36-38 (1996); Hendon, supra note 25, at 417-18.
78. See Bruce R. Hopkins, Partnerships or Joint Ventures as Vehicles To Achieve Charitable
Objectives, 31 CATH. LAW. 123 (1987); Michael Schill, The Participation of Charities in Limited
Partnerships, 93 YALE L.J. 1355 (1984).
79. The UBIT is levied at corporate rates: "(A) 15 percent of so much of the taxable in-
come as does not exceed $50,000; (B) 25 percent ... as exceeds $50,000 but does not exceed
$75,000; (C) 34 percent ... as exceeds $75,000 but does not exceed $10,000,000; (D) 35 per-
cent... as exceeds $10,000,000." 26 U.S.C.A. § 11(b)(1)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1999).
80. See GIVING USA, supra note 50, at 125; WOLPERT, supra note 36, at 27.
81. See supra Part I.
82. Jennifer Anne Spiegel, Note, Sierra Club: Rationalizing the Royalty Exception to the
Unrelated Business Income Tax, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1697, 1700 (1995).
83. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. This section provides a more concrete com-
parison between poverty-servicing charities and other nonprofits.
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2. Regulating the UBIT Exemption
The regulation of the UBIT exemption, like the UBIT itself, demands
criteria for application. Charitable organizations seeking exemption
should be subject to a test of accountability. The dedication-of-resources
prong would specify what is required of qualified charities. The aug-
mented IRS filing of the 990-T would supply the information necessary
for enforcement.
a. Dedication of Resources
The tests should require that exempt organizations be qualified chari-
ties, requiring the dedication of seventy-five percent of annual expenses
to poor relief 4 In addition, organizations seeking the UBIT exemption
would be required to commit seventy-five percent of the income ex-
empted from the final UBIT calculation to direct tax-exempt purposes.8s
b. Required Filing of a Comprehensive 990-T
Using the 990 tax forms and the other filings currently required by
IRS regulation, the revised dedication-of-resources test provides a means
of tracking and assessment. Currently, only charities with incomes of over
$1000 must file. The proposed exemption policy would adapt the 990-T
to monitor compliance with the dedication-of-resources test.
c. Penalty for Violation
In keeping with the spirit of the regulations, a violation of (a) or (b)
would result in immediate suspension of tax-exempt status.
B. Why Use UBIT To Aid Charities
Before 1950 and C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner,s nonprofits en-
joyed virtually unfettered funding in the for-profit world. Nonprofits like
New York University, which owned Mueller Macaroni Company, pur-
chased or operated businesses not related to their charitable charter and
used them as feeder organizations to pour profits into their nonprofit en-
deavors.87 Business enterprises allowed nonprofits a unique opportunity
84. See infra Section III.A.
85. Seventy-five percent serves as an example only. Without empirical analysis of the costs
of charities to operate business ventures, setting this second limit is premature.
86. 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
87. See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299,316-18 (1975).
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to generate revenue that was especially valuable to those nonprofits that
lacked the ability to charge substantial fees for their services.,8
The first corporate income tax law, passed in 1894, expressly ex-
empted unrelated business income if that income was dedicated to chari-
table purposes. 9 Congress and the courts rationalized that the profit re-
alized from unrelated business should be treated as investment income-
as income collected to support the organization's charitable purposes.6
Subsequent cases expanded the reading of the 1894 exemption, allowing
feeder corporations to remain tax-exempt so long as their profits fed
back into their parent nonprofit.9' Opponents feared the ability of indi-
viduals to form nonprofits to attain tax-exempt status for their businesses.
As one court noted, however, if a nonprofit did not carry out its non-
profit ends, the reason for its tax exemption would disappear.9 Other-
wise, as Boris Bittker and George Rahdert explained, "like dividends, in-
terest, membership dues, and contributions, business profits are sought as
a way of financing the organization's ultimate (and exempt) purposes."93
Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1950'4 in response to New York
University's ownership of Mueller, then one of the largest pasta makers
in the country. Competing business owners called for a tax on Mueller's
income and prompted lawmakers to argue that to allow Mueller to oper-
ate untaxed was akin to a government subsidy-inherently unfair and
economically inefficient.95
1. Understanding the UBIT
The result of the Revenue Act of 1950, the UBIT, taxed income from
enterprises that met three requirements."' First, the enterprise had to be atrade or business.9 Second, the enterprise had to be "regularly carried
88. See JAMES T. BENNETr & THOMAS J. DILORENzO, UNFAIR COMPETITION: THE
PROFITS OF NONPROFrrS 19 (1989).
89. See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 589, § 32,28 Stat. 509,556.
90. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden De Predicadores De La Porvicia Del Santismo Rosario
De Filipinas, 263 U.S. 578 (1924) (holding that the federal government could not tax a religious
organization's income from the sale of wine and chocolate).
91. See id. at 618; Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1938)
("No reason is apparent to us why Congress should wish to deny exemption to a corporation
organized and operated exclusively to feed a charitable purpose when it undoubtedly grants it if
the corporation itself administers the charity.").
92. See Unity Sch. of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61, 69 (1926).
93. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 87, at 317.
94. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814, §§ 421-422, 64 Stat. 906, 947.
95. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34
STAN. L. REv. 1017, 1017-20 (1982).
96. See Treas. Reg. § 1.511(a)(1) (1998).
97. Revenue Act of 1950 § 301(a), 64 Stat. at 948.
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on."98 Finally, the business had to be "substantially unrelated" to the ac-
tivities of the exempt organization. 99 For the purposes of the IRS, all
three elements must be met to trigger application of the UBIT."'0
a. "Trade or Business" Test
According to § 513 of the Internal Revenue Code, a trade or business
includes "any activity which is carried on for the production of income
from the sale of goods or the performance of services. 101 The regulations
do not specify the parameters of commercial ventures, thus the IRS gen-
erally treats most commercial activities as businesses for tax purposes.',
For the purposes of the UBIT exemption, the trade or business test is
wholly applicable, as the intent is to encourage charities to engage in
business enterprises.03
b. "Regularly Carried On" Test
As with the "trade or business" test, ambiguity surrounds what consti-
tutes a "regularly carried on" activity. In general, the guidelines specify
that the performance and duration of a commercial enterprise should be
compared to analogous commercial activities conducted by for-profit
firms. Several cases,0 4 revenue rulings,05 and academic articles °6 have
addressed the parameters of "regularly carried on." The test would cer-
tainly apply to the qualified charities because the prospective business




100. See Deidre Dessingue Halloran, UBIT Update, 36 CATH. LAw. 39 (1995).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.513(c).
102. Treas. Reg. § 1.513(b).
103. The parameters of trade or business will not be addressed in great detail. The subject
does not capture much attention, because it is not a widely contested prong of the UBIT test.
104. See, e.g., NCAA v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1990); Mobile Arts &
Sports Ass'n v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ala. 1957); Suffolk County Patrolmen's
Benevolent Ass'n v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1314 (1981), acq. 1984-1 C.B. 2.
105. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-424, 1973-2 C.B. 190; Rev. Rul. 75-201, 1975-1 C.B. 164; Tech.
Adv. Mem. 89-47-002 (July 31, 1989).
106. See Erik M. Jeusen, Taxation, the Student Athlete, and the Professionalization of Col-
lege Athletics, 1987 UTAH L. REv. 35, 46-47; Mary E. Monahan, Note, Unfair Competition or
Fundraising? A Proposal To Modify the Regularly Carried On Test of the Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 10 AM. J. TAX POL. 73 (1992).
107. Although the question of "regularly carried on" is an issue of grave concern to many
nonprofit organizations, it seems reasonable to predict that charities will concede the applica-
tion of the test.
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c. "Substantially Related" Test
The third and most relevant prong of the UBIT test mandates that
commercial activities conducted by tax-exempt entities be "substantially
related" to the exempt purposes of the organization. O' To qualify as a
related activity, the "IRS requires a substantial causal relationship be-
tween an activity and an organization's exempt purposes."' ' A causal
relationship exists only if the activity can be directly traced to the exempt
purposes. A standard example is that of a nonprofit experimental dairy
farm that produces milk."° If the farm chose to sell its milk to local stores
on a regular basis, the profits would not be subject to the UBIT because
the production of the milk is substantially related to the purpose of the
farm. However, the sale of ice cream or butter would incur a UBIT pen-
alty on profits. The sale of derivative products constitutes an unrelated
activity not tied to the purposes of the farm. Between the milk and the
ice cream, however, are a host of exceptions, ones that nonprofits regu-
larly invoke when facing adverse UBIT rulings.
The "substantially related" exceptions allowed for nonprofits span
volunteer labor,"' royalties,"2 gambling activities,"' and others."' The
current debate on the UBIT challenges the necessity of repeal by parad-
ing these exceptions, casting doubt on the need for any exemption at
all."5 The literature fails to distinguish, as this Note does, between excep-
tions for related businesses and an exemption for unrelated activities."6
2. WeFeed and the UBIT Exemption
The unrelated activity exemption proposed would allow the WeFeed
Food Bank, our fictitious example, to invest in a McDonald's franchise as
108. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3) (1998).
109. Halloran, supra note 100, at 43.
110. See id.
111. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513(a)(1) (1994).
112. See Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)(2) (1994).
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513(h)(1)(B) (1994).
114. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513(a)(2)-(f)(1) (1994).
115. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 95 (criticizing the economic analysis used to justify
UBIT). See generally Henry B. Hausmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business In-
come Tax, 75 VA. L. REv. 605 (1989) (criticizing the unfair competition rationale and posing
economic efficiency arguments); Donald L. Sharpe, Unfair Business Competition and the Tax on
Income Destined for Charity: Forty-Six Years Later, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 367 (1996) (surveying de-
velopments in the UBIT and the promulgation of additional bases for the tax); John M. Strefe-
ler & Leslie T. Miller, Exempt Organizations: A Study of Their Nature and the Applicability of
the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 12 AKRON TA J. 223 (1996) (examining the current state
of the UBIT and its justifications in relation to recent changes in exempt organizations).
116. See sources listed supra note 115.
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an untaxed source of income. Under the current UBIT regime, if the
franchise were to realize $350,000" s in profits for the fiscal year, thirty-
four percent would be taken in taxes. Because the franchise, although a
food service, is not substantially related to the exempt purpose of pro-
viding low-cost meals to the poor, the food bank would be subject to the
UBIT on the first dollar of profit. With the proposed JBIT exemption,
however, the food bank could reinvest the bulk of the income in its ex-
empt purposes, using the part of the amount saved from the UBIT to pay
workers and meet other business-related costs.9 A second example
would be that of a commercial parking lot operated by a collective of
homeless shelters. If the lot averaged $75,000 in profits each year, the
shelters could lose more than 25% in UBIT. Again, the exceptions to the
UBIT do not apply to the lot, and the charity loses important revenue.
With the current exceptions, neither the food bank nor similar charities
are relieved of the UBIT. The relevant exceptions, convenience, donated
merchandise, and the royalty modification, are discussed below.20
a. Convenience Exception
If a nonprofit's commercial activity is conducted for the convenience
of its members, students, patients, or employees, the profits from the
business are not subject to the UBIT.12' To illustrate, if the WeFeed Food
Bank sold its sandwiches only to those who ran the food bank, the UBIT
would not apply to revenues from sales of the sandwiches. Similarly, if
the food bank ran a cooperative food store instead and charged patrons a
membership fee, the profits from the cooperative would likely be exempt
from taxation and would meet the substantiality test1' The sale of food
117. The hypothetical is based on fiscal considerations including ease of market entry, start-
up costs, and the ability to utilize existing connections, such as links to communities in need of
low-skill employment.
118. Business Abstract Reports, DUNN & BRADSTREET, Apr. 8, 1998, available in Westlaw,
DUNBR File. I compiled the average income for 95 random urban and suburban McDonald's
sites nationwide.
119. See Eric W. Sokol, Comment, Making Tax-Exempts Pay: The Unrelated Business In-
come Tax and the Need for Reform, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 527, 532 (1990) (observing that tax-exempt
organizations have, in the past, "us[ed] their tax-free income to finance [d]ebt" and arguing
that, although this practice was often used to leverage funds for the acquisition of property, the
same principle applies).
120. "While an exception means that an activity is not an unrelated trade or business, a
modification means that the IRS will not tax the exempt organization on income from a par-
ticular, unrelated activity. Major modifications categories include dividends, interest, annuities,
rents and royalties." Halloran, supra note 100, at 47-48.
121. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513(a)(2) (1994).
122. Other examples include the sale of books to students or of medical supplies to pa-
tients. Defining membership constitutes the critical audit issue for other nonprofits. See Hal-
loran, supra note 100, at 45.
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to non-employees or non-members, however, renders the income subject
to the UBIT.
Why not have the food bank run a cooperative instead of the fran-
chise? Despite the number of charitable organizations qualified for the
convenience exception, the majority of the proposed patrons lack the re-
sources to purchase the food without assistance, and they would be un-
likely to do so from a cooperative, no matter how low the prices.'
Moreover, charging for a service designed to assist the poor would run
contrary to the mission of the charity and could conflict with the ability of
the charity to qualify for essential government funding.
b. Donated Merchandise and Low-Cost Items Exception
A second UBIT exception, one particularly relevant for charities, ex-
empts profits from the sale of items given to nonprofits."4 Thrift stores
run by charitable organizations fall within the ambit of this exception and
would also qualify under this Note's revised charity definitions. The
homeless shelter that sells thrift clothing to middle- and upper-income
patrons as well as the poor violates the UBIT exception. Under the pro-
posed exemption, however, the charity could generate revenue to pro-
vide the poor with clothing at a low cost and also fund its shelter pro-
gram.
c. Royalty Modifications to UBIT
Royalty-payments exceptions also attract fierce criticism from UBIT
proponents.' 26 Under the modification rules currently in place, the UBIT
does not apply if the nonprofit organization receives "passive income"-
that is payment for "activities not tending to incite competition between
for-profit and nonprofit organizations."' The IRS exempts royalty in-
come from the proceeds of a patent license, the rental of mailing lists, or
the sale of a logo for a credit card.'2 In general, however, the passive in-
come rule leaves little room for charities to qualify. Where a major uni-
versity can lease its logo to a major credit card company, few charities
generate the recognition required to attract a buyer. The same holds true
for the sale of the logo for advertising purposes in catalogs or calendars.
Charities will rarely have an opportunity to take advantage of the royalty
exception.
123. See supra Section III.A.
124. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513(a)(3) (1994).
125. See Halloran, supra note 100, at 46.
126. See, e.g., id.; Spiegel, supra note 82.
127. Spiegel, supra note 82, at 1699.
128. See Halloran, supra note 100, at 48; Spiegel, supra note 82, at 1699.
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As demonstrated, the existing exceptions do not extend to the com-
mercial ventures envisioned for charities. Unlike other nonprofits, chari-
ties cannot engage in substantially related activities and are, therefore,
almost automatically subject to the tax and the potential loss of their tax-
exempt status. Employing the "poverty services" test opens the world of
commercial endeavors to a new generation of charities.
IV. RESPONSES TO THE UBIT EXEMPTION PROPOSAL
Beginning with its inception in 1950, lawmakers, courts, nonprofits,
and academics have debated the UBIT's necessity and considered ways
to extend or contract its reach.'29 This Part responds to the prevailing cri-
tiques of UBIT exemption. Section A anticipates objections to the pov-
erty-services test. Section B reacts to the unfair competition rationale, the
initial justification for UBIT. Section C turns to questions of economic
efficiency. Section D engages the most recent criticism of UBIT repeal,
that UBIT is a tool for accountability and monitoring compliance with
the regulations of nonprofits.
A. Preempting Objections to the UBIT Exemption
Charities, organizations dedicated to poor relief and trying to meet
the burgeoning consumption of subsistence services, desperately need al-
ternative sources of revenue. The most obvious source is the commercial
enterprise, because an "exemption of income" provision already exists
for the business ventures of nonprofits.
Congress, while set in its devolutionary ways, is receptive to solutions
for operational dissonance. In the past few years, Congress has consid-
ered two proposals designed to address the fall-out from devolution. The
first proposal, the Charity Tax Credit ("CTC"), is the brainchild of for-
mer Republican Senator Dan Coats. The proposal would offer a $500 tax
credit to individual donors who give to qualified charities.30 A second
piece of legislation making its way through Congress is Democratic Rep-
resentative Tony Hall's Good Samaritan Act,13' proposed in response to
the Second Harvest report on hunger in America. The proposal would
allow deductions for farmers and small businesses donating food to nutri-
tion programs and food banks.
32
129. See generally Sharpe, supra note 115.
130. See S. 1079, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1994, 105th Cong. (1998). Although Sen. Coats's
bills never made it out of committee, his idea has been revived in the current Congress. See S.
997, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1607, 106th Cong. (1999).
131. See H.R. 1325,106th Cong. (1999).
132. See Sarasohn, supra note 18.
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The UBIT exemption, like the CTC and the Good Samaritan Act,
would not require direct subsidies. Rather, the UBIT exemption is a tax
expenditure policy, one that permits legislators to resolve dissonance
without creating additional government programs or directly funding ex-
isting ones. 3 The continued survival of nonprofit organizations serves as
a testament to the Congressional support of tax expenditure policies.'
1
For example, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 extended the UBIT excep-
tion for royalties to include corporate sponsorship.'35 The UBIT exemp-
tion would follow the current trends toward replacing direct subsidies
with implicit subsidies, making it a politically feasible solution."'
With the UBIT exemption, government would pave the way for nu-
merous mutual benefits. Auxiliary funds would offer charities an oppor-
tunity to end their dependence on government funding and gain greater
autonomy in service provision. With autonomy in funding would come
the chance to innovate in service delivery and even the level of service
itself-opportunities not currently available to organizations reliant on
government funds.
B. Unfair Competition
When for-profit corporations compete with nonprofit, tax-exempt or-
ganizations, for-profit corporations often fear the ability of the nonprofits
to undercut prices and to drive their unsubsidized counterparts out of the
market."7 Several law-and-economics scholars and some courts reject
these contentions, maintaining that the unfair competition rationale is, at
best, dubious and possibly a screen for alternative concerns.1' In any
133. See generally HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 378 (1995).
134. See ABRAMSON & SALAMON, supra note 7, at 54.
135. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, § 965, 111 Stat. 788, 893-94.
136. See Charles Clotfelter, Economics of Giving (Mar. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
137. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 95, at 1023 (citing Richard L. Kaplan, Intercollegiate
Athletics and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1430, 1432 (1980)); see
also Atkinson, supra note 30.
Advocates for for-profits maintain that current federal policies give nonprofits unfair
competitive advantages in the same revenue generating activities in which for-profits
engage. The most frequently stated objective of the unfair competition crusade is to
restore and police the traditional boundary between for-profits and nonprofits, a
boundary defined with greatest particularity in federal tax law but evident in other ar-
eas as well.
Id. at 507.
138. See, e.g., Clarence LaBelle Post No. 217, Etc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.
1978). In Clarence LaBelle, the court considered the application of UBIT to proceeds from a
bingo game operated by a nonprofit. The appellant questioned the proper application of the tax
if the game did not directly compete with for-profit competitors. The court acknowledged the
question but refused to establish a standard that would make income taxable only under the
unfair competition rationale. Because the charities would compete directly with for-profit actors
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event, provisions in the dedication-of-resources test address the eco-
nomic objections to the UBIT exemption for charities, particularly those
premised on unfair competition.
1. Predatory Pricing
The underlying rationale for the U-BIT asserts that, without it, chari-
ties would engage in predatory pricing, charging below-market-value in
an attempt to eliminate competition. At the outset, however, a line must
be drawn between "aggressive competition" and predatory pricing.' The
fear of predation as a consequence of exemption can be abated through
both a prohibition of such activity through the poverty-services test and a
careful consideration of such an outcome.
Taking the latter first, critics must bear in mind the implausibility of
predatory pricing from the small group of organizations eligible for UBIT
exemption. Poverty-servicing charities may enter the market at a com-
parative advantage, given the socially conscious destination of profits.
They will, however, just as likely face the necessary disadvantage of en-
tering a market with fewer resources than their competitors. This disad-
vantage leaves scant room for aggressive competition-let alone a con-
certed effort of predatory pricing.
Some academics also respond to worries of predation with the ration-
ale that if price-cutting were profitable, for-profit competitors would do it
as well.' 40 Others, such as Rose-Ackerman, suggest that the fear of com-
petition is based on the large after-tax profit margin enjoyed by exempt
organizations.14 Economists note, however, that charities would not en-
gage in traditional predatory pricing when their profits can be better
spent to defray costs and invest in charitable missions. 4 Even the seminal
case of C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner held that no evidence existed
in their markets, however, a discussion of alternative rationales lies beyond the scope of this
Note.
139. See Jonathan Moore Peterson, Taming the Sprawimart: Using an Antitrust Arsenal To
Further Historic Preservation Goals, 27 URB. LAW. 333, 345 (1995); see also Northeastern Tel.
Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 1981).
140. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 139.
141. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 95, at 1020.
142. See Julie A. Roin, Unmasking the "Matching Principle" in Tax Law, 79 VA. L. REV.
813, 851 (1993); see also John Copeland, Some Suggestions for Revision of Tax-Exempt Organi-
zation Rules, 51 TAX NOTS 911, 915 (1991).
[A]lthough tax exemption may provide an organization with the ability to underprice
taxable competitors, the actual effect of the tax exemption on an organization's com-
mercial behavior is not clear. While some exempt organizations may price their goods
and services at less than what the market will bear, others may seek to maximize fi-
nancial returns because of concerns such as funding or expansion.
Id.
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to support the competitor's claims of predatory pricing.'4 UBIT was born
after NYU won its case, when Congress realized that the litigants were
anticipating a possible problem and not reacting to an existing situation.
An affirmative step in the poverty-services test could allay concerns
as well. As generally small- to medium-sized organizations with a pre-
scribed limit on the use of funds, UBIT-exempt charities would find
predatory pricing to be an economically unsound venture. The additional
provision in the proposed poverty-services test would require charities to
operate at or near fair market value or jeopardize their tax status. 1' If
charities are compelled to allocate the bulk of their commercial profits to
exempt purposes, the margin available for predatory pricing, if intended,
shrinks and the potential loss of tax-exempt status reduces motivation.45
2. Excessive Entry
UBIT proponents are also concerned about the expansion of UBIT-
exempt organizations into unrelated markets. The proposed UBIT ex-
emption necessarily triggers this criticism. The benefits of charities in un-
related markets, however, outweigh the possible costs. 146 The dispersion
of UBIT-exempt businesses throughout the markets diffuses the impact
of indirect subsidies to nonprofits.47 Without the ability to move into un-
related markets, charities would be forced to sell program-related serv-
ices. Unless they sell their subsistence services in a manner similar to the
Salvation Army, they are taxed for any income generated. Significant
profit-making from services to the poor is questionable at best. With a
guarantee of fair market value and a reinvestment of revenue into ex-
empt purposes, the threat to unrelated markets further diminishes.
143. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120,127 (3d Cir. 1951).
144. I do not propose a fair-market-value test in the poverty-services test, however, because
of the debate surrounding the unfair competition rationale.
145. See supra Section II.C.
146. Whereas a museum can sell art-related items and hospitals can rent out laboratory
space, charities cannot market related items. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
147. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 95, at 1037-38.
The nonprofit section is, after all, rather small relative to the economy as a whole. If
the sector's productive business investments were spread across the economy, they
would be unlikely to have much competitive impact. But the tax on unrelated business
income prevents such dispersion. Tax-exempt firms must now concentrate their profit-
able endeavors in those few lines of business judged to be "related." For example, the
growth of gift shops and vacation tours operated or sponsored by nonprofit organiza-
tions may be, in part, a response to the conditions of the tax law. Such concentration in
a few areas makes it much more likely that the business activities of nonprofits will
impose losses on competitive for-profit firms....
It appears, then, that the tax on unrelated business activity creates more unfairness
than it can possibly prevent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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3. Unfair Subsidy
Opponents of the UBIT exemption disagree about the fairness of a
subsidy for charities in the for-profit market, the by-product of exempt-
ing taxable income.'4 As with all subsidies, the UBIT exemption derives
its justification in large part from two theories of subsidization: public
good and altruism. The public good theory justifies subsidies for charities
in the form of tax exemption by imputing to government an obligation to
support the production of social welfare services. 149 The more applicable
theory for charities, however, is the theory of altruism.50 Altruism claims
that if charities confer benefits on a community without regard to com-
pensation, they warrant special tax treatment.
a. Public Goods Theory
The theory of public goods, or traditional subsidy theory, assumes or-
ganizations merit tax exemption when they produce goods or services
valued by consumers. Charitable services are construed as a public good
when consumers "reveal their true preferences and [c]ontribute to public
revenues accordingly."'' The history of social welfare services bears out
this societal preference for aid to the poor. Even in the context of devolu-
tion, the continuation of aid to the poor through TANF and similar pro-
grams evinces a sustained belief that poor-relief is a public good. While
Congress cuts back on the provision of services, the bitter contest sur-
rounding those cuts supports the theory. Further, federal funds remain a
mainstay of poverty-relief services, with state and local governments con-
tributing as well.12 The public goods theory justifies a subsidy for chari-
ties as an extension of a well-documented public preference for govern-
ment-sponsored poor relief. Both citizens and government rely on
charities as partners in social-service provision and as the safety net for
those whom government does not aid.
b. Altruistic Theory
Rob Atkinson's altruism theory responds to the following question:
"Should nonprofits be encouraged to arise and operate in areas other
than those in which the orthodox theory predicts they will be the most
148. Bittker and Rahdert, while not opposed to UBIT specifically, do question the validity
of an additional subsidy to nonprofits. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 87, at 36; see also
Sokol, supra note 119.
149. See FRED FOLDvARY, PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES 7 (1994); Atkin-
son, supra note 30, at 517. See generally STEPHEN SHMANSKE, PUBLIC GOODS, MIXED GOODS,
AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1991).
150. See Atkinson, supra note 30.
151. Hendon, supra note 25, at 417.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 10-18.
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efficient suppliers?"1 53 Altruistic theory accepts the positive construct of
the public good theory and maintains that "favorable tax treatment of al-
truistic nonprofits is an affirmative preference for something they pro-
vide."'' By extension, the UBIT exemption for charities acknowledges
our historical obligation to the poor and offers charities an opportunity to
further dedicate their activities. The altruism theory requires the exis-
tence of need and the uncompensated benefactor. Charities provide both
and deserve the reward of the UBIT exemption.
The unfair competition critique suffers from scant empirical support,
questionable analysis, and an inappropriate application to the charities in
question. As one commentator has noted, "both courts and academics
have contributed to the demise of the unfair competition rationale, leav-
ing no guiding principle for the application of the UBIT and its excep-
tions."155
C. Economic Efficiency
Critics, notably Henry Hansmann, also argue that repeal of the UBIT
could result in economic inefficiencies for both the market and the ex-
empt organization.'56 First, the market would suffer by the entrance of
nonprofit, tax-exempt participants unless the organization has no for-
profit parallel or provides a better service.'57 Second, UBIT-exempt chari-
ties would fail to diversify their investments, overcrowding in one portfo-
lio. 58 Third, the UBIT exemption would cause charities to horde monies
and not expend resources on present programs. 59 Each inefficiency cri-
tique, however, assumes that all nonprofits would reap the benefits of ex-
emption. Because the exemption applies only to charities, the effects are
markedly different and generally refutable.
Hansmann believes that tax exemptions should be allowed only
where the income derives from an activity more efficiently performed by
the nonprofit.' 6 This criticism, while valid, ignores the present situation
of charities. Without the ability to enter related markets, the only venue
open to charities exists in competitive markets.61 In addition, the pro-
posed UBIT exemption only applies to a limited number of organiza-
153. See Atkinson, supra note 30, at 510.
154. Atkinson, supra note 30, at 618.
155. Spiegel, supra note 82, at 1720.
156. See Hansmann, supra note 115, at 626-33.




161. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
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tions, some of whom will elect not to participate, mitigating the competi-
tive effect. The competitive-effect critique also lacks empirical support.
Hansmann posits that, without the UBIT, nonprofits would receive a
higher rate of return on investment and on savings. 62 The increased abil-
ity to save would inhibit spending and encourage nonprofits to underfund
current projects in favor of future possibilities. 63 There are two responses
to Hansmann's argument. First, as noted in Part I, many of the organiza-
tions affected by the change in charitable status do not have large en-
dowments or massive savings. Indeed, they tend to operate from subsidy
to subsidy, donation to donation.'6 Inhibiting their ability to save, the in-
evitable consequence of a tax on income, encourages this dependence on
other forms of income.'65 Instead, the repeal of the UBIT for charities
would encourage savings and investment, a necessary step to financial
stability. Financial stability would relieve the stress on government to
serve as the primary donor to charity. Likewise, it would compensate for
the low level of private donations to charities.
Hansmann's third concern theorizes that organizations would cease to
be "present-oriented" and would cut spending on current projects in or-
der to save for future expenditures.'6' Hansmann fears that, for example,
universities would cut spending to research and teaching to invest in un-
related businesses.' 67 Again, the very nature of the charities and their role
contradicts this possibility. Charities are uniquely "present-oriented."
Unlike universities or research foundations, future production of goods
does not have the same value to a charity. The rise in the number of
homeless and jobless will result in more charities offering emergency
services like food and shelter.' Cuts in medical funding and the accelera-
tion of diseases like AIDS through the poor community mandate medical
care for the indigent. 69 Charities do not have the luxury of conservation
of resources. The mandate of society, especially now, requires that chari-
ties remain active in the anti-poverty arena. Rather than retreating to
count their coins, the history of charities unequivocally suggests that the
resources not dedicated to stability will go directly to funding services.
162. See Hansmann, supra note 115, at 613-17.
163. See id. at 619.
164. See Kammer Testimony, supra note 11.
165. See generally DAvID HYMAN, ECONOMIcS 744 (1991).
166. See Hansmann, supra note 115, at 618.
167. See id. at 619.
168. See supra notes 12, 14 and accompanying text.
169. See WOLPERT, supra note 36, at 27.
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D. Accountability
This Note's proposed UBIT exemption would open the way for chari-
ties to enter the commercial market and would allow those organizations
to reap indirectly subsidized profits. Nonetheless, the UBIT, in addition
to gathering revenue for the federal government, acts as a means of
holding charities accountable. Perhaps the most salient attack on the
proposed UBIT exemption, the accountability argument does not rely on
economic analysis or defunct competitive rationales. ° Rather, the ac-
countability rationale requires that the public and government have the
ability to monitor the actions of these new entrants to the competitive
market.17 ' To this end, the UBIT acts an "intermediate monitor" of chari-
table activities.' 72
The proposed poverty-services test,73 however, provides an alterna-
tive source for fostering accountability in those charities that choose to
participate. First, the test compels charities to file comprehensive 990-T
forms, something not currently required of most charities. The new form
would not only replace the UBIT as an intermediate check but would
also give the public a better sense of what exists in the nonprofit world.) 4
The penalty component of the test acts as a further check against abuse,
rendering the UBIT unnecessary. Charities would be unwilling to jeop-
ardize their tax-status, particularly when there is little hope of private
benefit 5
V. CONCLUSION
Charitable organizations occupy a unique position in the nonprofit
sector. Charities are the answer to the twin failures of market and gov-
ernment to allocate resources and to supply services for the poor. The
advent of operational dissonance, the tension between our expectations
170. See Spiegel, supra note 82, at 1738.
171. Spiegel notes that nonprofits especially require monitoring.
Accountability is particularly important because, generally, exempt organizations are
less accountable than for-profits. With respect to for-profit organizations,
"[c]ompetitive pressures in product markets, labor markets, and markets for manage-
rial control assure consumers that businesses will be reasonably responsive." Exempt
organizations, because of the accumulation of tax privileges, are more isolated from
these competitive pressures, and therefore, exempt organizations are less accountable
to the public.
Id (footnotes omitted) (quoting James T. Bennett, Unfair Competition and the UBIT, 41 TAX
NOTES 759,763 (1988)).
172. See id. at 1739.
173. See supra Subsection III.A.2.
174. A ubiquitous critique is that there is a lack of information about the nonprofit sector,
despite its tax privileges.
175. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3) (1998).
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of service and failure to provide resources for it, requires a dramatic
change.
When charities agree to fulfill the covenant broken by the public sec-
tor, they earn the right and the ability to demand concessions from both
the private and public sectors. As currently applied, the UBIT diminishes
the ability of charities to generate income, save, and invest. Although the
UBIT exemption for charities is a small first step, it is critical to resolving
operational dissonance and carving out a fairer place for charities.

